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sent to the cards' issuances. Beard
also alleged that the reporting of
the balances due on the cards to
CBI, a credit reporting company,
caused his credit rating to suffer
substantially. These claims are re-
ferred to as Beard I.
Additionally, Beard, together
with another consumer, brought a
second suit against several of the
stores involved in Beard I. Beard
alleged that, because the compa-
nies had failed to register as retail
creditors, they had not complied
with the District of Columbia Con-
sumer Retail Credit Regulations,
16 D.C. Mun. Regs. 102.1 (1987).
This claim is referred to as Beard
II. The two cases were consolidat-
ed on appeal.
No Evidence of Negligence
The trial court, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia,
granted the merchants' summary
judgment motion in Beard I. Beard
appealed, claiming negligence on
the part of the companies in ac-
cepting fraudulent credit applica-
tions and reporting detrimental
credit information pertaining to
the balances owed on the accounts.
Beard claimed that the mer-
chants' negligence was proven by
their failure to exercise due care in
verifying the application informa-
tion. He argued that if the mer-
chants had exercised proper due
care, the credit cards would not
have been issued and, therefore,
the injury to his credit rating would
have been avoided. He also
claimed the merchants were negli-
gent in failing to adhere to their
own application review process.
In the appellate court, the mer-
chants again filed a motion for
summary judgment on the basis
that there was no evidence of negli-
gence. Relying on affidavits de-
scribing their processing proce-
dures, the merchants argued that
their guidelines had been followed
in Beard's case, and therefore, due
care had been exercised. Several of
the merchants claimed that their
credit application review proce-
dures were standard in the retail
industry.
Beard submitted an investiga-
tor's affidavit stating the mer-
chants had failed to contact
Beard's employer to verify the ap-
plication information. However,
Beard failed to submit any expert
affidavits demonstrating the stand-
ard of care applicable to the mer-
chants, nor did he define such a
standard by any other method.
The appellate court held that
while the affidavits submitted by
the merchants were relevant to
proving due care, a mere showing
that their procedures conformed
with industry custom was not
enough to support a summary
judgment motion. Rather, the
court held that summary judgment
must be granted due to Beard's
failure to submit expert testimony
demonstrating the merchants' neg-
ligence.
The court held that, in general,
where the subject matter is beyond
the knowledge and understanding
of the average person, expert testi-
mony is necessary in order for
plaintiffs to prove negligence. The
court then explained that the gen-
eral public is not aware of the
available methods for detecting ap-
plication fraud, nor how much the
adoption of such methods would
ultimately cost the merchants' cus-
tomers. Therefore, the court held
that the proper standard of care to
be used by merchants in the pro-
cessing of retail credit card applica-
tions was beyond the knowledge of
the average juror, and Beard need-
ed expert testimony to establish
negligence.
Beard's allegation that the mer-
chants failed to adhere to their own
procedures for processing applica-
tions was also rejected. Beard had
submitted affidavits and exhibits
showing the inaccuracies of some
of the information on the applica-
tions, such as incorrect social secu-
rity numbers, salary figures, and
address listings. The court found,
however, that such inaccuracies
could not be detected from the face
of the applications and that Beard
failed to prove a duty of further
inquiry. Consequently, the court
held that Beard had failed to pre-
sent any issue of fact for trial
regarding evidence of the mer-
chants' negligence.
Consumer Regulations Do Not
Apply
In Beard II, the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia granted
summary judgment in favor of the
merchants. Beard appealed on the
grounds that several of the mer-
chants failed to comply with 16
D.C. Mun. Regs. 102.1 (1984),
which requires all retail sellers to
register with the Office of Consum-
er Protection. Beard claimed that
as a result of their failure to regis-
ter, the merchants must return all
money paid to them for goods
purchased during the non-registra-
tion period.
The appellate court rejected
Beard's registration argument for
two reasons. First, the regulation
provided several means of enforce-
ment, none of which allow for a
private party to bring a civil action.
The court held that the regulation
was intended to be enforced by
public officials or through private-
ly instigated administrative pro-
ceedings.
Further, the appellate court did
not recognize the remedies Beard
demanded. The regulation intend-
ed relatively small penal sanctions,
such as fines of up to $300 or
imprisonment for no more than 10
days. The court rejected the argu-
ment that the regulation had in-
tended to allow for drastic forfei-
tures. Due to its penal nature, the
law was to be strictly construed
and could not support such forfei-
ture by implication.
Beard admitted to having suf-
fered no injury as a direct result of
the merchants' failure to register
according to 16 D.C. Mun. Regs.
102.1. The legislation from which
the regulation stemmed only pro-
vided protection and relief to con-
sumers who had suffered actual
injury. The court held that injury
was a condition precedent to suit
under the regulation and thus
barred Beard's claim. The court
upheld the grant of summary judg-
ment.
Gwen M. Geraghty
Wyoming Extends
Warranty Of Habitability
To Minor Construction
Defects
In Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273
(Wyo. 1990), the Supreme Court of
(continued on page 32)
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Warranty of Habitability
(continued from page 31)
Wyoming held that an implied
warranty of habitability and fitness
is breached not only by major
defects rendering a house uninhab-
itable, but also by minor construc-
tion defects resulting in temporary
injury to the property.
Background
Mr. and Mrs. Jay and Mr. and
Mrs. Himes ("Homeowners")
lived in townhouses built by Re-
gency Construction Company
("Builder"). The Jays were the
original purchasers and the Himes
were the second purchasers of their
townhouses. Both Homeowners
experienced excessive humidity
and dampness in their basements
that led to the development of
mold, mildew, and an offensive
odor. Neither family was forced to
abandon their homes, but some
personal property stored in the
basements was damaged by mold
and rust. As a result, the Home-
owners were reluctant to finish the
basements as living areas unless
the excessive humidity problems
were corrected.
Consequently, the Homeowners
brought this action against the
Builder alleging negligent con-
struction and breach of an implied
warranty of habitability. To reme-
dy the problems, the Homeowners
asked that the Builder either: cor-
rect the defects; or pay monetary
damages for the cost of removing
and replacing the basement floors,
the decrease in the value of their
homes, or the loss of the use of the
basements.
The District Court's Opinion
At trial, both parties introduced
evidence as to the possible causes
of the defects, the appropriate re-
pairs, and the associated costs.
Based on this evidence, the Dis-
trict Court, Laramie County,
found that the excessive dampness
was probably due to pooled water
in the ground under the basements,
which could easily be remedied by
installing a mechanism to allow the
water to drain out from under-
neath the homes. As a result, the
trial court found in favor of the
Homeowners on their theory of
breach of an implied warranty of
habitability but not on their theory
of negligent construction. Each
homeowner was awarded $1,980
for the decreased value of their
homes. In addition, the Jays were
awarded $765 for personal proper-
ty damages, and the Himes were
awarded $87.04 for repair bills.
The Builder appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming, and the
Homeowners cross-appealed,
claiming that the damage awards
were inadequate.
Implied Warranty of Habitability
Applies
On appeal, the Builder first
claimed that an implied warranty
of habitability is breached only by
major defects which render a house
unfit for habitation. Therefore, the
Builder argued, the award of dam-
ages here was improper because
the Homeowners failed to show
either the existence of major de-
fects or that the townhouses were
uninhabitable. The Builder relied
on the court's ruling in a prior case
that the sale of a new home carries
with it an implied warranty that
the residence is reasonably con-
structed and fit for habitation.
This rule was later extended to
subsequent purchasers as well.
Therefore, the Builder argued, be-
cause the trial court found that the
Homeowners' residences were hab-
itable and not negligently con-
structed, the implied warranty of
habitability had not been
breached.
The Wyoming Supreme Court
rejected the Builder's argument
and held that the implied warranty
of habitability applies to both ma-
jor and minor defects. Although
builders are not obligated to deliv-
er perfect houses, they must either
correct minor defects or pay mone-
tary damages for repairs. Alterna-
tively, major defects which render
a house uninhabitable entitle the
homeowner to rescind the con-
struction contract.
The court reiterated the ra-
tionale that the purpose of a war-
ranty is to protect innocent pur-
chasers and hold builders account-
able for their work. Therefore,
consumer protection demands that
home buyers be able to rely on the
skill of the builders and know that
houses are constructed so as to be
reasonably fit for their intended
uses. The court concluded that the
implied warranty of habitability
and fitness is breached if a home-
owner proves both the existence of
a minor construction defect and a
resulting temporary injury to the
property. Therefore, the court up-
held the trial court's finding that
the implied warranty of habitabili-
ty had been breached when exces-
sive moisture in the basements
damaged personal property and
prevented the Homeowners from
using the basements as living areas.
Additionally, the court noted
that the word habitability is some-
what misleading because it seems
to base a breach of implied warran-
ty on the condition that the house
be uninhabitable. The court felt
that "merchantability" or "fitness
for a particular purpose" would
more accurately convey the mean-
ing of the warranty. When viewed
in this context, the court added, the
warranty assures a buyer that a
house is reasonably suited for its
intended use.
No Duty to Mitigate Damages
The Builder also claimed that
the Jays had failed to mitigate their
personal property damages. The
Builder based this claim on evi-
dence showing that Mr. Jay detec-
ted the dampness when he first
moved into the home but neverthe-
less continued to store personal
property in the basement. In re-
sponse to this claim, the court
explained that once an injury has
occurred, a homeowner's duty is to
take reasonable measures to pro-
tect the property from additional
damage. Here, however, the evi-
dence showed that the Builder led
the Jays to believe that no problem
existed. Furthermore, Mr. Jay had
attempted to eliminate the damp-
ness and excessive humidity.
Therefore, the court upheld the
lower court's decision that the Jays
had discharged their duty to miti-
gate damages.
Damage Awards Were Adequate
On cross-appeal, both Home-
owners claimed that their damage
awards were inadequate. The court
held that although the evidence
presented at trial was in conflict as
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to the appropriate remedy and
associated costs, the record was
sufficient to justify the trial court's
judgment on the issue of damages.
Thus, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the damage
awards.
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the ma-
jority held the Builder liable even
in the absence of negligence. This
strict liability theory, based on the
Wyoming Uniform Commercial
Code, was incorrect because the
code does not apply to real proper-
ty. The dissent also argued that
under the strict liability theory, all
builders would be forced to insure
the construction of the houses they
built. Such a standard would re-
quire builders to attend to and
repair even the slightest defects
and would result in increased costs
to consumers. Finally, the dissent
argued, the majority's approach
was unnecessary because the reme-
dies developed in the Wyoming
Supreme Court's prior cases were
sufficient to protect homeowners.
Richard B. Vaughn
New Jersey Supreme
Court Finds Tooth
Discoloration Strict
Liability Claim Not
Preempted By FDA
Regulation
In Feldman v. Lederle Lab-
oratories, 592 A. 2d 1176 (N.J.
1990), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that federal law did not
require prior approval from the
Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") before a drug manufac-
turer could warn of a known or
knowable danger in its products.
Consequently, the court found that
federal law did not preempt a strict
liability claim brought under New
Jersey state tort law against a drug
manufacturer for failure to warn
that one of its products could cause
tooth discoloration.
Background
This case involved tetracyclines,
a group of antibiotics first pro-
duced in 1948, which are primarily
used to treat bacterial infections.
In 1959, Lederle Laboratories
("Lederle") introduced a new form
of tetracycline, demethylchlorte-
tracycline, marketed under the
trade name Declomycin.
Dr. Harold Feldman had treated
his daughter, Carol Ann Feldman
("Feldman"), with Declomycin
two or three times a year between
1960 and 1963. Feldman's baby
teeth were discolored gray-brown.
When her permanent teeth
emerged in 1965, they too were
discolored. Prior to 1963, Declo-
mycin contained no warning of
tooth discoloration as a potential
side effect.
Lederle had a long history of
correspondence with the FDA re-
garding the potential side effects of
various tetracyclines. In Novem-
ber, 1962, Dr. Swanzey, an em-
ployee of Lederle, wrote a letter to
the FDA notifying the administra-
tion of the possible correlation
between tooth discoloration and
tetracycline use. In this letter, Dr.
Swanzey proposed adding a warn-
ing of the potential side effects to
the labels of all Lederle tetracycline
products.
The FDA responded that it had
not yet reached any conclusions,
but would contact Dr. Swanzey
once it made a final determination.
In January, 1963, Dr. Swanzey
wrote the FDA with additional
information regarding the side ef-
fects of tetracycline use, one of
which was tooth discoloration. In
February, 1963, the FDA informed
Lederle of its conclusion that tetra-
cycline use had an effect on the
bones and teeth. Furthermore, the
FDA proposed that a warning be
placed on Tetracycline, Chlortetra-
cycline, and Oxytetracycline. At
this time, the FDA had no specific
clinical evidence that Declomycin
caused tooth discoloration, but
confirmed that it would remain
alert for the possibility of such
correlation.
Through Dr. Swanzey, Lederle
continued to correspond with the
FDA regarding the possibility that
Declomycin caused tooth staining.
In July, 1963, the FDA stated that
it required factual evidence of ad-
verse reactions to substantiate any
official regulatory change in warn-
ings. Because Lederle could only
speculate as to the connection be-
tween Declomycin and tooth dis-
coloration, the FDA had chosen
not to change its official stance
regarding the warning.
Finally, on November 11, 1963,
after negotiations with the FDA, a
Lederle official wrote the Adminis-
tration that the company would
include a warning statement on its
Declomycin label. The FDA ac-
cepted the proposed warning,
which was incorporated into the
packaging of Declomycin in De-
cember, 1963.
Subsequently, in 1978, Feld-
man, through her father as guard-
ian ad litem, sued Lederle in New
Jersey state court to recover dam-
ages for her tooth discoloration
under theories of negligence, gross
negligence, breach of express and
implied warranties, and strict
products liability.
Lower Court Proceedings
The trial court entered judgment
on a jury verdict in favor of Led-
erle, and Feldman appealed. The
Superior Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, affirmed. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted Feldman's
petition for certification and re-
manded the case back to the appel-
late division for reconsideration.
The appellate division affirmed its
original position. This time the
supreme court reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. At the
second trial, the jury returned a
verdict for Feldman on the sole
count of strict liability for failure to
warn under state tort law. The
appellate division reversed and re-
manded for entry of judgment in
favor of Lederle. From this ruling,
the New Jersey Supreme Court
again granted Feldman's certifica-
tion petition.
Supreme Court Opinion
The New Jersey Supreme Court
first addressed Lederle's argument
that Feldman's cause of action
based on state law failure to warn
was preempted because of an actu-
al conflict with federal laws and
regulations. The court made clear
that Lederle first had to overcome
a presumption against preemption,
since state power is not to be
superseded by federal acts unless it
(continued on page 34)
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